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CONCLUSION ........................................................

A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standardof behavior.As to this there has developed
a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegratingerosion" of
particularexceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.

-Chief Judge Cardozo'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Roughly half of American households invest in mutual funds,2
making the mutual fund industry both highly lucrative3 and subject to
* Writing and Research Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2011,
University of Miami School of Law; B.B.A., University of Miami. I am grateful to Professor
Robert Rosen for his insightful comments and to Matthew McGuane for his outstanding editing.
Special thanks to my family for their unfailing support.
1. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 536 (N.Y. 1928) (citations omitted).
2. John P. Freeman et al., Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary
Test, 61 OKLA. L. REv. 83, 83 (2008) (citing INv. Co. INST., 2006 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT
BOOK (46th ed. 2006)). "According to one industry insider, most of the money saved by
Americans from 1999-2001 was used to purchase mutual fund shares." Id. at 83 n.2.
3. Id. at 89 (noting that two of the top three best performing American stocks over the last
twenty-five years were mutual fund sponsors); id. at 90-91 ("Compound average annual returns
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considerable debate over just how lucrative it ought to be.4 This debate
is as much ethical as it is economic and stems, in part, from the fact that
mutual funds have been successfully marketed as an everyman's investment tool, while employing a unique corporate structure that is "fraught
with potential conflicts of interest" 5 and encourages self-dealing to the
detriment of unsophisticated investors.'
Simply put, mutual funds are "created and managed by a preexisting external organization known as an investment adviser which
generally supervises the daily operation of the fund and often selects
affiliated persons to serve on the company's board of directors."' Industry critics argue that because of the tightly intertwined arrangement
between a fund and its adviser, mutual fund boards cannot, "as a practical matter, terminate their relationships with their advisers."' Thus,
advisers, free from competitive pressures, are able to charge their aptly
named "captive funds" fees for advisory services9 that are well above
market value.'o Moreover, because the advisory fee structure is usually
set up as a percentage of assets under management, as the fund grows,
so does the possibility that fees will become excessive."
The Supreme Court has twice recognized that it was Congress's
concern over the "potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies,]"l 2 that prompted it to enact the Investment Company
for the five largest publically traded fund sponsors were more than double returns on the S&P 500
market index over corresponding periods.").
4. Compare John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund
Industry: Evidence and Implicationsfor Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 154-60 (2007) with Freeman

et al., supra note 2.
5. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Jones v. Harris
Assocs. L.P., No. 08-586 (U.S. June 15, 2009) [hereinafter Brief for United States] (quoting Daily
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984)).
6. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 4 (summarizing criticisms of the mutual fund
industry).
7. Brief for United States, supra note 5, at 2 (quoting Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 536
(internal quotations omitted)).
8. Id. at 3 (citing SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 148 (1966)).
9. Although the investment adviser often provides some other managerial services to the
fund, the adviser's primary duty is research and stock selection. See Freeman et al., supra note 2,
at 1-2.
10. See generally id. (comparing captive mutual fund advisory fees to advisory fees paid by

other investors who purchase portfolio management services on the open market and finding that
captive funds paid at least double for equivalent services).
11. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 820-21 (8th Cir. 2009). See generally
Freeman et al., supra note 2 (discussing how economies of scale lead to excessive advisory fees).
But see Coates & Hubbard, supra note 4 (arguing that economies of scale are relatively modest
and do not create windfall profits for advisers as the fund grows).
12. Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 536 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979)).
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Act of 1940,13 a regulatory scheme designed to increase board independence and improve disclosure and transparency.1 4 In response to claims
that the ICA hadn't gone far enough to protect investors,' 5 the ICA was
amended in 1970 to include, inter alia, section 36(b), which imposes a
"fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services"
on investment advisers.16
In Jones v. HarrisAssociates L.P.," mutual fund investors alleged
that their adviser had breached this statutory fiduciary duty by charging
its captive fund roughly double what it charged its independent institutional clients, such as pension funds, for similar services.' 8 In an opinion authored by Chief Judge Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the adviser, holding "[a] fiduciary must
make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on
compensation." 9 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit: (1) continued the
nearly thirty-year streak of adviser victories in mutual fund fee cases;2 0
(2) explicitly rejected the long standing Gartenbergstandard for evaluating section 36(b) claims; 2 1 and (3) prompted the Supreme Court to grant
13. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. The Investment Company Act will be referred to textually as the
"ICA."

14. See Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 536-37; Brief for United States, supra note 5, at 2.
15. See S. REP. No. 91-184 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9847; see also Daily
Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 537-38; Burks, 441 U.S. at 482.
16. Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act states in relevant part:
[T]he investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to
have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of
payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company .

. ..

An

action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a security
holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such company, against
such investment adviser . . . for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such
compensation or payments paid by such registered investment company . . . to such
investment adviser or person. With respect to any such action the following
provisions shall apply:
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in
personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of
fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action approval by the board of directors of such investment
company of such compensation or payments .

..

. shall be given such consideration

by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
17. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P. (Jones II), 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct.
1418 (2010).
18. Id. at 631.
19. Id. at 632.
20. See Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 823 n.4 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that no
investor has obtained a verdict against an investment adviser in the twenty-five years since
Gartenberg)(citation omitted); Sam Mamudi, Ruling Over Fees Raises the Stakes, WALL Sr. J.,

Apr. 15, 2009, at CIl.
21. The widely accepted standard rejected by Jones was established in Gartenberg v. Merrill
Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P. (Jones III),
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certiorari to resolve the circuit split. 22
This note argues that by misconstruing (if not purposefully circumventing) the fiduciary duty imposed by section 36(b), Jones created a
standard that is blatantly unfaithful to the ICA's language and purpose.
However, this note further argues that the Supreme Court need not have
granted certiorari to disapprove of Judge Easterbrook's standard because
although it appears to be a radical departure, an analysis under Jones is
the functional equivalent of an analysis under Gartenberg.
Part I of this note analyzes the relevant law leading up to Jones,
specifically focusing on the Gartenberg standard and the confusion that
developed with regard to the parameters of the fiduciary duty under
36(b).
Part 1I briefly discusses the facts and procedural posture of Jones
including Judge Easterbrook's panel opinion and Judge Posner's dissent
from the Seventh Circuit's decision to deny rehearing en banc. Additionally, Part II analyzes Judge Easterbrook's interpretation of the fiduciary duty imposed by section 36(b) and argues that the standard he
advances is of little practical significance in terms of affecting the outcome of section 36(b) claims.
Part III explains the various approaches proposed by the parties on
appeal to the Supreme Court and also explores some of the scholarly
debate that developed in the wake of the Seventh Circuit's decision.
This section briefly addresses the Supreme Court's opinion vacating
Jones; however, because the opinion is primarily a reaffirmation of the
Gartenberg standard, it is not the focus of this article. Rather, this section argues that no judicially created standard adequately protects investors. Real reform in this area has to come from Congress because no
court can fix the underlying problem with section 36(b)-its allocation
of the burden of proof to plaintiffs. Finally, this section explores the
implications of a burden of proof properly allocated to defendants.
II: A

ICA, THE GARTENBERG STANDARD,
AND THE FIDUCIARY DUTY IN PRACTICE

HISTORY IGNORED: THE

Prior to the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970,23
courts evaluated claims challenging advisory fees under the corporate
waste standard.2 4 Under this standard, "an unreasonable or unfair fee
537 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2008) (denying rehearing en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting); see
discussion infra Part Ill.
22. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009) (granting certiorari).
23. Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413.
24. Daniel D. Birk, Note, A Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P. and
the Limits of Public Choice Textualism, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
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might be approved unless the court deemed it 'unconscionable' or
'shocking.' "25 Not surprisingly, lawsuits under this lenient standard
were largely ineffective at curbing perceived fee abuses by advisers. 2 6
In response to mounting concerns over the rapidly expanding mutual
fund industry, 27 the ICA was amended to include section 36(b), which
imposes on advisers a "fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation" 28 and gives investors an apparent remedy-a private right of
action against an adviser who breaches this duty.29
Although the ICA places the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty on the plaintiff, the act makes clear that it is not necessary for
the plaintiff "to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal
misconduct." 3 0 In addition, section 36(b) requires that "approval by the
board of directors ... of such compensation ... be given such consideration by the court as deemed appropriate under the circumstances."
Notably, section 36(b) does not specify what constitutes a breach of
the adviser's fiduciary duty as to compensation. 32 Thus, the sizeable task
of developing a workable standard that was consistent with the legislature's intent was left to the courts.
A.

The Rise of the Gartenberg Standard

In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management,3 4 the Second

Circuit attempted to carry out this task, and in doing so "created the
framework that has served as the starting point for interpreting a fund
adviser's fiduciary duty" 35 for the last twenty-eight years. In
Gartenberg, mutual fund investors alleged, "because of their fund's
exponential growth, the adviser's fee had become so disproportionately
large that it constituted a breach of fiduciary duty." 6 After a bench trial,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392562 (citing Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 541 n.12
(1984)).
25. Id. (quoting Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 541 n.12 (1984)).
26. Id.

27. Brief for United States, supra note 5, at 3 (citing Daily Income Fund, Inc., 464 U.S. at
537-41); S. REP. No. 91-184, at 6 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9847.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006). See text supra note 16.
29. § 80a-35(b).
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P. (Jones 1), No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 27, 2007), affd, 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) ("The statute
does not delineate the specific boundaries of the fiduciary duty it imposes on investment advisers
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id.
694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 821 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id.
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the district court found that the fees "were comparable to those charged
to other money market funds," and on that basis, ruled in favor of Merrill Lynch." On appeal, the Second Circuit refused to find the mere
comparability of fees dispositive. The court noted that section 36(b) was
enacted for the purpose of mitigating the competitive deficiencies inherent in the mutual fund market,3 and held that in order to breach its
fiduciary duty "the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonablerelationshipto the services

rendered and could not have been a product of arms-length
bargaining." 39
The Second Circuit then listed a number of non-exclusive factors
"bearing upon whether an adviser's compensation was within the range
that could be expected to result from an arms-length bargain[ ]. . . ."40
Namely, the quality of the services provided by the adviser; the profitability of the fund to the adviser; fall-out benefits (i.e., "non-fund securities business generated by fund customers and interest income on funds
(known as the 'float')");4 1 economies of scale; the fee structure of comparable funds; and the independence, expertise, and the care and conscientiousness of the board of directors.4 2
In short, the Gartenberg standard established that the fees charged
to comparable funds should be one aspect of the analysis, while
acknowledging that this one factor could not provide a complete picture.
Because of the insulated nature of the mutual fund market, the court
reasoned, mere "reliance on prevailing industry advisory fees will not
satisfy § 36(b)." 43 Moreover, the court specifically noted that while candor and proper disclosure during the negotiation process were relevant to
the 36(b) analysis, alone they could not insulate the adviser from breaching its fiduciary duty where the fee charged was "disproportionately
large" in relation to the services rendered." By requiring an analysis of
"all pertinent facts,"4 5 that is, both process (at least to some degree) and
price in relation to value, Gartenberg properly gave effect to the lan37. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D.N.Y 1981), affid,
694 F.2d at 928 (2d Cir. 1982).
38. Gallus, 561 F.3d at 821.
39. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928 (emphasis added).
40. Jones I, No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *6 (N.D. 111.Feb. 27, 2007), aff'd, 527 F.3d
627 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
41. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 932.
42. Id. at 928-31.
43. Id. at 929.
44. Id. at 930. ("[Elven if the trustees of a fund endeavored to act in a responsible fashion,
and adviser-manager's fee could be so disproportionally large as to amount to a breach of
fiduciary duty in violation of § 36(b).").
45. Id. at 929.
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guage in section 36(b) requiring that a reviewing court give the board's
approval of an adviser's compensation appropriate consideration "under
all the circumstances." 4 6
Ultimately however, the standard, which on its face appeared to be
a success for plaintiffs, proved too difficult to meet. The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal, reasoning that plaintiffs had failed
to meet their burden of showing that the fees were "so excessive or
unfair as to amount to a breach of fiduciary duty within the meaning of
36(b)." 47 Specifically, the court pointed to the fact that fund investors
had "enjoyed a better-than-average return" 48 while rejecting plaintiffs'
economies of scale and fall out benefits arguments for lack of proof.' 9
Gartenbergwould prove to be the first in a long line of cases to come to
this result.
B.

Parametersof the Fiduciary Duty Under Section 36(b): A
Comparative Analysis

Although the Gartenberg standard was widely accepted,"o the language of section 36(b) is exceedingly vague. (In fact, during oral argument, with regard to the 36(b)(2) provision requiring the Court to give
the board of director's approval of the fee "such consideration . . . as is

deemed appropriate under all the circumstances[,]" Justice Scalia sarcastically quipped, "That's a wonderfully clear command, isn't it?"") As a
result, even where Gartenberg was embraced, the Circuits differed substantially as to the weight to be given the factors.
Creating a more troublesome issue, various sections of the ICA
impose requirements on investment companies with regard to board
composition, director independence, and disclosure.5 2 In addition, section 36(a) of the ICA prohibits any "practice constituting a breach of
46. 15 U.S.C. 80a-35(b)(2) (2006).
47. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 930-32.
50. See Jones III, 537 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2008) (providing an extensive list of cases
favorably citing Gartenberg).

51. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010)
(No. 08-586).
52. Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 328 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-10(a), 80a-15(c)). U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) provides that at least 40% of the board's
directors must not be "interested persons" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2. The debate over
director independence has been brewing for some time in both this arena and in corporate law. In
short, the argument is that definitions of "independent" are too lenient and directors are often
closer to executives, or in this case, fund advisers, than is ideal. See Lyman Johnson, A Fresh
Look at Director "Independence": Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five,

61

VAND.

L. REv. 497, 521 (2008), for an interesting discussion of this issue. See also discussion

infra Part III.B.
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fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct" by directors and advisers.53 However, unlike section 36(b), these sections do not give investors
a private right of action. Thus, after Gartenberg it remained unclear
whether breaches of fiduciary duty involving "personal misconduct" or
failures to comply with ICA mandates could be considered in an analysis of a section 36(b) breach of fiduciary duty as to compensation. On
this issue, the federal courts reached differing results.54
For instance, in Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming International,

Inc., the Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' argument that section
36(b)'s private right of action included claims for breach of fiduciary
duty in negotiating fees.5 6 The Migdal plaintiffs alleged that the fund
advisers breached their fiduciary duty because (1) the fees they received
were excessive; and (2) their fund's purportedly "'independent' directors were not actually disinterested parties as required by the ICA . . .
[because they served on the boards of multiple funds] within the T.
Rowe Price Fund Complex."" Accordingly, they argued, their investment advisers" had breached their fiduciary duties under section 36(b)
by failing to negotiate their advisory agreements at arms-length.5 9
The court disagreed, finding, "[s]ection 36(b) is sharply focused on
the question of whether the fees themselves were excessive, and not on

the status of the directors who approved them."6 0 Consequently, the
court held claims for general breaches of fiduciary duty were outside the
scope of section 36(b) and would have to be brought under some other
section of the ICA or under state law. 6 '
The Third Circuit took a slightly broader view of the duty imposed
by section 36(b) than the Fourth Circuit did in Migdal. In Green v. Fund
Asset Management, L.P.,62 "[p]laintiffs, shareholders in seven closed53. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2006) (authorizing the SEC to bring an action alleging that a
person acting as an "officer, director, member of any advisory board, investment adviser or
depositor .... has engaged .. . or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct").
54. Compare Migdal, 248 F.3d at 321 with Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 286 F.3d 682
(3d Cir. 2002), discussed infra part II.
55. 248 F.3d at 321.
56. Id. at 328.

57. Id. at 325. The Migdal Court noted that "[u]nder the ICA, at least forty percent of a fund's
directors must be 'disinterested'-i.e., independent of the investment adviser." Id. at 324.
58. In Migdal, plaintiffs were investors in two separate funds that were part of the T. Rowe
Price Fund Complex. Two T. Rowe Price Affiliates served as investment advisers of plaintiffs'
respective funds. Id. at 325.
59. Id.

60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 329. Of course, this construction is problematic because the other sections of the
ICA, including section 36(a), do not provide a private right of action.
62. 286 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 2002).
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end, 6 3 publicly traded municipal investment funds," brought suit against
their investment advisers under section 36(b)." Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Green did not allege the fees charged were excessive. Rather,
they contended that a fee structure incentivizing the adviser to keep the
fund fully leveraged created an actual conflict of interest which
"amount[ed] to a per se breach of fiduciary duty under 36(b)." 6 5 In addition, plaintiffs argued that by failing to disclose this conflict in the
Funds' prospectus, the advisers committed a "separate actionable breach
of fiduciary duty."6 6
The Third Circuit held that the mere existence of a potential conflict of interest in a fee arrangement was not a per se breach of the
adviser's fiduciary duty as to compensation. 6 7 However, the Third Circuit did go on to consider plaintiffs disclosure argument. The court ultimately dismissed the claim on the grounds that the defendant had
adequately disclosed the method by which fees would be calculated." In
considering the merits of the claim, however, the court seemingly indicated that adviser behavior and statutory compliance was part of the section 36(b) "fiduciary duty with respect to fees" analysis-a significant
departure from the Fourth Circuit's interpretation.
Yet, just five months after Green, the Third Circuit heard another
advisor fee case and narrowed its interpretation of section 36(b). In
Krantz v. PrudentialInvestments Fund Management, LLC, 6 9 the Third
Circuit likened the plaintiffs' claims to those made by the plaintiffs in
Migdal. Adopting the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit, the Krantz Court
rejected the argument that advisers could breach their section 36(b) fiduciary duty by accepting a fee negotiated by directors who were not "disinterested." First, the court held that plaintiffs must allege "facts
indicating that the fees received were disproportionate to services rendered"o in order to survive a motion to dismiss." Additionally, the
63. Closed-end funds differ from open-end funds in that they have "fixed capitalization and
may sell only the number of shares of its own stock as it originally authorized. . . . [Additionally,]
securities are not redeemed at the shareholder's option and shares are traded on a secondary
market." Jones I, No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007), aff'd, 527 F.3d
627 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (quoting Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp.,
295 F.3d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 2002)).
64. Green, 286 F.3d at 683.
65. Id. at 684.
66. Id.

67. Green, 286 F.3d at 685. Plaintiffs were unable to point to any instance during the ICA's
one-year limitation period where the advisers actually failed to de-leverage the Funds in order to
maximize their fees where it would have been in the investors best interest to do so. Id. at 686.
68. Id. at 686.
69. 305 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2002).
70. Id. at 143.
71. The court further concluded that Krantz had failed to do so. Id.
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court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the directors were "interested" within
the meaning section 10(a) of the Act7 2 by virtue of the fact that they
participated on multiple boards."
One of two things may be deduced from this holding. First, the
court may have been dismissing the argument that directors could somehow be "interested" even when they do not fall strictly within the section
2(a)(19) 74 definition of an "interested person." Alternatively, and more
likely in light of the court's endorsement of Migdal, the holding stands
for the proposition that even if the directors were "interested" as defined
by the Act, this would not, in and of itself, constitute a breach of section
36(b) so long as the fees negotiated by the interested directors were not
disproportionately large.
Thus, both the Fourth and Third Circuits ultimately seemed to
agree that it is acceptance of a disproportionately large fee, and not the
process by which the fee is negotiated that is the linchpin of the section
36(b) analysis. Under this interpretation, the ICA necessarily does not
give investors a private right of action against advisers simply because
they fail to comply with procedural requirements in negotiating fees.
Interestingly, in 2009, the Eighth Circuit breathed new life into the
broad reading of the fiduciary duty imposed by section 36(b). In Gallus
v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc.," plaintiffs alleged that their adviser,

Ameriprise, breached its fiduciary duty not only by charging an excessive fee relative to the fees charged to its institutional clients, but also by
actively misleading the board of directors into accepting this fee.7 6
Ameriprise, on the other hand, argued that it did not mislead the board,
and that in any event, the fees charged to institutional clients were irrelevant for the purpose of determining if a fee was disproportionately large.
An adviser, they argued, cannot be liable for breach of fiduciary duty
under section 36(b) so long as its fees are in line with the fees paid by
other mutual funds.
Adopting an enhanced standard resembling the "entire fairness"
standard found in corporate law (albeit, with a reversed burden of
proof),78 the Eighth Circuit rejected defendant's arguments. Reversing a
summary judgment in Ameriprise's favor, the Gallus Court found that
72. 15 U.S.C. §80a-10(a) (2006).
73. Krantz, 305 F.3d at 142.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (2006).
75. 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010) (mem.).
76. Id. at 818. Plaintiffs cited the "San Diego Office Report," which Ameriprise had provided
at the board's request. The report purported to compare the fees paid by Ameriprise's mutual
funds with those of its institutional investors. Plaintiffs' experts testified that the report omitted
information in order to make the fee discrepancy seem smaller than it was. Id.
77. Id. at 820.
78. See discussion infra Part HI.C.
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Gartenberg "provided a useful framework for resolving claims of excessive fees""7 but that the fiduciary duty contemplated by section 36(b)
also includes an analysis of the adviser's conduct during negotiation:
We believe that the proper approach to § 36(b) is one that looks to
both the adviser's conduct during negotiation and the end result....
Unscrupulous behavior with respect to either can constitute a breach
of fiduciary duty.... The district court should not have engaged in so
limited a scope of review. Ameriprise's conduct must be evaluated
independentfrom the result of the negotiation. The district court concluded that Ameriprise did not breach its fiduciary duty in one way
(by setting a fee that was exorbitant relative to that of other advisers),
but it should have also considered other possible violations of
§ 36(b). Specifically, the court should have determined whether
Ameriprise purposefully omitted, disguised, or obfuscated information that it presented to the Board about the fee discrepancy between
different types of clients. The record indicates that there are material
questions of fact on this issue.so
However, even the Gallus Court went on to recognize that "Congress allocated the burden of proof to plaintiffs, both with respect to
establishing the existence of a breach of fiduciary duty . . . as well as

demonstrating the existence of a cognizable financial harm resulting
from that breach."" Which begs the questions: If the fees received are
not "exorbitant" or "disproportionately large," how could one prove that
the adviser's "other possible violations" caused any damages at all?
And, if one cannot, what is the purpose of this second inquiry?
As to the issue of evaluating excessiveness, the court held that
under Gartenberg, comparisons with the fees charged to other institutional investors, such as pension funds, for similar financial advising
services are relevant and appropriate in determining whether fees are
disproportionate. 82 Echoing the sentiments of Professors Freeman,
Brown, and Pomeranz 83 the court reasoned: "We are also unpersuaded
by the assertion that the fee disparity simply reflects what different
investors are willing to pay. The purpose of an inquiry into the fees paid
by institutional, non-fiduciary clients is to determine what the investment advice is worth." 84
While the Gallus decision arguably marked a victory for investors
(as well as scholars in favor of more comprehensive review of adviser
79. Gallus, 561 F.3d at 822.

80. Id. at 823-24 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 823 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 824.

83. See Freeman et al., supra note 2; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
84. Gallus, 561 F.3d at 824.
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fees), the plaintiffs' fate remains uncertain. The judgment was vacated
and the case remanded for further consideration in light of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Jones-the black sheep out of the Seventh Circuit."
III.

OVERVIEW: JONES V. HARRIS ASSOCIATEs, L.P.

Significantly, prior to Jones, the section 36(b) debate surrounded
the relevance of adviser conduct during negotiation (i.e., fairness of process) in analyzing whether a 36(b) breach of fiduciary duty occurred.
That the amount of the fee (i.e., whether it was "so disproportionately
large that it [could] bear[ ] no reasonable relationship to the services

rendered," 8 6 ) was relevant to the 36(b) analysis went relatively unquestioned. And although it was unclear exactly what type of exorbitance
might meet this standard, given that the statute imposes a "fiduciary

duty as to the receipt of compensation" it seemed unlikely that the
amount of the compensation could be irrelevant. Yet, the Seventh Circuit decided exactly that.
The plaintiffs in Jones were investors in the Oakmark Funds, a
complex of three mutual funds created and managed by their investment
adviser, Harris Associates." Much like their predecessors, the Jones
plaintiffs alleged that their fund adviser had breached its fiduciary duty

under section 36(b) by charging the Oakmark Funds excessive fees."
Specifically, the Oakmark Funds' fees were roughly double" those paid

by Harris's institutional investors, such as pension funds, for similar
advisory services.9 0 According to the plaintiffs, this disparity was clear
evidence that the fees were disproportionate to the value of the services
provided.91

In addition, plaintiffs alleged that Harris "impermissively retained
savings it realized from economies of scale as the Funds grew .... "92
Further, like the plaintiffs in Migdal and Krantz, they argued that certain
directors on Oakmark's board were not "disinterested" within the meaning of the ICA because they were so closely affiliated with Harris, 93 and
85. Ameriprise Fin., Inc. v. Gallus, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010) (mem.).
86. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).
87. Jones I, No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007).
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *6-7.
See id. at *3.

92. Id. Although the fee structure consisted of a graduated pay scale whereby Harris received
smaller percentages of assets under management as the fund grew, Plaintiffs argued that the break
points were so high that little of the savings realized from economies of scale were passed on to
shareholders. Id. at *7.
93. Plaintiffs took particular issue with the fact that one of the board's "disinterested"
directors was a former partner of Harris Associates. His partnership had been bought out with a
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that Harris breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose the nature of
its relationships with the directors.9 4
In its motion for summary judgment, Harris countered that the
advisory fees it charged the Oakmark funds "were in line with those
charged by .

..

other similar funds managed by other companies," and

urged the court to disregard comparisons to the fees paid by institutional
clients." Harris also stressed the fact that the board of directors had
engaged in an informed negotiation over the fee and had approved the
price structure.96
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois refused to
disregard comparisons to the fees paid by Harris's institutional clients."
However, the court, applying Gartenberg,98 found that to the extent the
fees paid by the institutional clients were relevant, they merely established a lower limit in a wide range of prices investors were willing to
pay. 9 Thus, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that plaintiff's failed to set forth an issue of fact as to
"whether there [was] a fundamental disconnect between what the funds
paid and what the services were worth." 0
Interestingly, in coming to this conclusion, the district court
rejected dicta from an earlier Seventh Circuit case, Green v. Nuveen
0 In Nuveen, plaintiffs asserted a claim similar to that
Advisory Corp.o'
made by the plaintiffs in the Third Circuit's Green v. Fund Asset Man-

agement, L.P. Essentially, they argued that the fee structure itself (a
percentage of assets under management) created a conflict of interest
and that the advisers had breached their fiduciary duty by accepting it.102
In a footnote later relied upon by Judge Easterbrook in his Jones opinion,10 3 the Nuveen court endorsed a "slightly more broad[ ]" reading of
the 36(b) fiduciary duty."'' Nuveen suggested that in a proper case
(which it characterized as "improbable") a plaintiff might be able to survive summary judgment if it could point to a conflict of interest that
series of deferrable payments, contingent on Harris's performance in a given year. Plaintiffs
argued this was a form of profit sharing, making the director a security holder, and thus, an
interested person under 15 U.S.C. § 80 a-2(a)(19)(B)(iii). Jones II, 527 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir.
2008).
94. Id.

95. Jones 1, 2007 WL 627640, at *6-7.
96. Id. at *6.
97. Id. at *7.
98. Id. at *6.
99. Id. at *7.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
295 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 742.
Jones II, 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008).
Nuveen, 295 F.3d at 743 n.9.
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actually caused shareholders to lose current income. But, the court
noted, even then, damages under the statute would be limited to the
amount of compensation received.'o' Nevertheless, the district court
refused to take the Seventh Circuit up on its invitation to employ this
broader approach, instead opting for a narrow, but not unusualo 6 reading of the provision, stating:
Plaintiffs do not explain how the disclosure of [a board member's]
deferred compensation in a filing to the SEC relates to the § 36(b)
fiduciary duty with respect to compensation received by Harris.
There is no evidence that any failure to disclose impacted the amount
of fees Harris was paid. To sweep this conduct into the ambit of
§ 36(b) would directly contradict the universal view that the fiduciary
0
duty it sets out is both narrow and limited.o

Stating what seemed to be obvious, the court added, "the different
nature of the claim involved in [Nuveen] counsels against a conclusion
that the Seventh Circuit would not apply the Gartenberg standard in an
Surely, most would have
excessive fees case such as this one."'
agreed.
A.

Judge Easterbrook'sPanel Opinion: A Duty Defined

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.' 0 9 However, in an opinion
authored by Chief Judge Easterbrook, the court expressly "disapprove[d]
the Gartenberg approach." 1 o The panel reasoned that Gartenberg's
factor-oriented test, which compares price to value, gave too little deferAccording to the court, the economic supposience to free-markets."
tions underlying the ICA and Gartenberg-namely, the widespread
belief that adviser fees are insulated from competitive forces' 2 -are no
longer applicable. 1 1 3 To support its conclusion, the panel noted that
"[tioday thousands of mutual funds compete[]"" 4 and "competitive
processes are imperfect but remain superior to a 'just price' system
105. Id.
106. See Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001).
107. Jones I, No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007) (citing Nuveen,
295 F.3d at 743 n.8; Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 286 F.3d 682, 684-85 (3d Cir. 2002);
Migdal, 248 F.3d at 329). It is worth noting that although the Third Circuit Green opinion did
contain language that supports the cited proposition, this article argues that ultimately its holding
was somewhat broader than the Jones I court seemed to suggest.
108. Id. at *6.
109. Jones II, 527 F.3d at 635.
110. Id. at 632.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 633.
114. Id.
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administered by the judiciary.""' Moreover, while funds may rarely fire
their advisers, "investors can and do 'fire' advisers cheaply and easily by
moving their money elsewhere.""'
Easterbrook analogized the fiduciary duty imposed by section 36(b)
on an adviser to that imposed by the law of trusts on a trustee: It requires
a fiduciary to "make full disclosure and play no tricks" but does not
impose "a cap on compensation.""' In other words, Judge Easterbrook's
standard is disclosure dispositive. Assuming the process by which the
fee is approved is "fair," it is almost impossible for an adviser to breach
its fiduciary duty by imposing it. The court did provide one caveat, noting that "[iut is possible to imagine compensation so unusual that a court
will infer that deceit must have occurred or that the persons responsible
for the decision have abdicated.""'
Easterbrook relied on the Third Circuit's Green case for further
support of his reading of 36(b) and pointed to the footnote in Nuveen to
support his contention that the Seventh Circuit had previously indicated
that Gartenbergwas "wanting."" 9 Fascinatingly, he made no attempt to
square the fact that both of those cases had endorsed a broader view of
section 36(b) which included a review of the fee negotiation and
approval process, but neither had made that analysis dispositive, or even
suggested that it should be a predominate factor. However, applying its
new standard the court held that the plaintiffs' claim necessarily failed
because they did not argue that "Harris Associates pulled the wool over
the eyes of the disinterested trustees. . ..
B.

120

Judge Posner's Dissent: A Word of Caution

The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc with
five judges dissenting.121 In an opinion by Judge Posner, the dissenters
primarily took issue with the panel's rejection of Gartenberg, pointing
out that none of the case law cited in the panel opinion actually supported Easterbrook's claim that the Seventh Circuit had previously indicated that the Gartenberg approach was "wanting." 22 Judge Posner
disagreed with the panel's blind faith in the power of the market to con115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 632 (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§ 242 & cmt. f).

Id.
Id.

120. Id. at 635.

121. Jones III, 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008) (denying rehearing en banc).
122. Id. at 729 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d

738 (7th Cir. 2002) was not an excessive fee case and did not disapprove of Gartenberg). See
see Jones I, No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27,
discussion supra part II;
2007).
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trol advisory fees, citing both the legislative history of the ICA and
recent economic analysis indicating that the sheer volume of mutual
funds had not cured the anti-competitive nature of the industry. 123
The dissent was also far more reluctant to dismiss the evidence of
comparable fees proffered by plaintiffs, commenting: "A particular concern in this case is the adviser's charging its captive funds more than
twice what it charges independent funds." 2 4 Moreover, the dissent
found that the panel's conclusion that fees charged by other funds were
not comparable was nothing more than "airy speculation."l 2 5 According
to Posner, the panel's new "disclosure dispositive" fiduciary duty
"misse[d] the point-which is that unreasonable compensation can be
evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty." 26
C.

The Standard Applied: How Jones Nullifies Section 36(b)

Judge Easterbrook was correct in his assertion that "section 36(b)
does not say that fees must be 'reasonable' in relation to a judicially
created standard."1 27 However, he incorrectly assumed that this fact renders the amount of the fee irrelevant in a section 36(b) analysis, despite
clear statutory language to the contrary. Under Easterbrook's standard,
the actual amount of the fee charged is only relevant in exceptional circumstances.128 The more appropriate inquiry, according to the court, is
whether the board made a "voluntary choice ex ante with the benefit of
adequate information."1 2 9 In coming to this conclusion, the Jones panel
relied too heavily on common law notions of fiduciary duty while ignoring the fact that section 36(b) specifically modifies this duty by adding
the words "with respect to receipt of compensation." 30 Conspicuously
missing from section 36(b) is any reference to a fiduciary duty with
respect to negotiation of compensation. In fact, section 36(b)(1) specifically states that it shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any
defendant engaged in personal misconduct.' 3 1 And that is no surprise.
Under the common law and certainly under the 1940 version of the ICA,
advisers were already obligated to negotiate truthfully with disinterested
123. Jones III, 537 F.3d at 731-32 (citing John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund
Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 634 (2001)).

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 731.
Id. at 732.
Id. (emphasis added).
Jones II, 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. ("It is possible to imagine compensation so unusual that a court will infer that deceit

must have occurred .

. ..

129. Id. at 633.
130. 15 U.S.C. 80a-35(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
131. Id. (emphasis added).
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directors.13 2 The Jones Court's attempt to make the two duties synonymous renders 36(b) superfluous. Had encouraging truthful negotiation
been Congress's goal, it would not have needed to amend the Act to do
so. Moreover, the legislative history makes clear that the concern was
not that advisers would be deceitful in negotiating their fees, it was that
they would not have to be, because the funds are captive and the directors would approve their fees regardless of whether they were a "good
deal."' 3 3 Thus, the only way to curb this problem was to make the
advisers themselves responsible for accepting a fee that they knew was
unfair or disproportionately large.
Ironically, nowhere is the fallacy of the court's process-based standard more obvious than in its own opinion. The Jones plaintiffs did
allege that that Harris Associates failed to disclose financial links
between itself and the fund's directors.134 Yet the Jones court "makes
short work of these" claims,13 dismissing them at the outset because
"although 36(b) creates a private right of action, the other sections we
have mentioned do not.""' (These "other sections" included section
10(a), requiring 40% of trustees (directors) to be "disinterested";' section 15(c), requiring approval of the adviser's fee by a majority of disinterested directors;13 and section 33(b), requiring disclosure of financial
links between the directors and the advisers).13 9 In essence, all processbased breaches of fiduciary duty fall within "other" provisions of the
ICA,140 and none of them provide a private right of action. 14 1 If the
section 36(b) private right of action is only triggered by process-based
breaches of fiduciary duty, and allegations of process-based breaches
necessarily involve allegations of violating other provisions of the ICA
that may be "easily dispensed with" because they do not a provide private right of action, what is left of 36(b)? Apparently, the answer is only
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTs, § 243 (1959) ("If the trustee commits a breach
of trust, the court may in its discretion deny him all compensation ... .); see also Migdal v. Rowe
Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 328 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining an adviser's duties under
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10(a) and 80a-15(c)).
133. See Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2009) (discussing lack of
arm-length bargaining as reason for congressional regulation in the mutual fund industry).
134. Jones II, 527 F.3d at 629.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006).
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (2006).
140. See discussion supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
141. See Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2002) (referring
specifically to the ICA: "Congress's explicit provision of a private right of action to enforce one
section of a statute suggests that omission of any explicit private right to enforce other sections
was intentional.") (quoting Olmstad v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2002)).
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the hypothetical fee that is so unusual that misconduct can be inferred,
but does not fall within any of the already statutorily prohibited conduct.
Remarkably, this isn't even the biggest problem with the Jones
standard. Even assuming that such a remarkable case came along, section 36(b)(1) specifically states that "plaintiff shall have the burden of
proving breach of fiduciary duty"' 4 2 and 36(b)(2) limits damages to
"actual damages resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty."' 4 3 Therefore, even if there was misconduct, and even if there were an implied
private right of action, plaintiffs would end up in the exact same place
they started; i.e., unable to prove damages except by reference to the
fees charged to other mutual funds, which ostensibly suffer from the
same process deficiencies. It becomes clear that the fiduciary duty created by Jones is a mere illusion. Thus, so long as all mutual funds continue to charge exorbitant fees, there can be no successful 36(b) claim.
IV.

WHAT

To Do

ABOUT

36(B)?

If we assume, as we should, that Congress intended the section
36(b) amendment to be more than mere surplusage, then the question
becomes, how can section 36(b) be implemented to have effect?
A.

The Parties' Arguments

Both the investor-plaintiffs and the adviser-defendant in Jones
argued to the Supreme Court that the Seventh Circuit's formulation
should not be adopted.'" Predictably, the plaintiffs argued that the fiduciary duty imposed by section 36(b) requires both fairness of price and
fairness of process: "First, the adviser must fully and accurately disclose
all material facts relating to its compensation. Second, the compensation
must be fair to the fund, meaning that it comports with what would be
bargained for in an arm's-length transaction."' 4 5 Interestingly, at the
trial level, plaintiffs had argued that Gartenberg should not apply
because it was too narrow in this regard.146 However, in petitioners'
appellate brief to the Supreme Court, they argued that this two-part analysis is what the Gartenberg Court intended, but that subsequent courts
perverted its holding to stand for a pure fairness of price analysis, narrowly limited to comparisons with fees charged to other captive
funds.'4 7 In fact, they argued, Gartenberg was not so limited. On its
142. 15 U.S.C.
143. 15 U.S.C.

§ 80a-35(b)(1) (2006).
§ 80a-35(b)(2) (2006).

144. See Brief for Petitioners, Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (No. 08586); Brief for Respondent, Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (No. 08-586).
145. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 17.
146. Jones 1, 2007 WL 627640, at *6.
147. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 29.

2010]

JONES V. HARRIS ASSOCIATES, L.P.

225

facts, Gartenberg refused to draw comparisons between money market
funds and pension funds because they were not sufficiently similar, but
"[t]he [Gartenberg] court did not suggest that a comparison of fees
charged for like services provided to different clients (e.g., a mutual
fund and an institutional client with the same investment objective)
would be irrelevant."l 4 8 In essence, the plaintiffs advanced the same test
set out by the Eighth Circuit in Gallus, but suggested that it was a clarification of Gartenberg rather than a new standard.
Perhaps more intriguingly, Harris Associates also urged the
Supreme Court to reject the Jones standard, but in favor of a more circumscribed reading of Gartenberg.14 9 (Perhaps this is because the
Gartenberg standard has proved to be such a winner for adviser-defendants.) In any event, Harris suggested that other Circuits were correct in
their interpretations-Gartenberg does not provide for any "fair process" review because such review is not supported by the text or legislative history of the Act. 50 Moreover, comparisons to institutional clients
can only be supported if the "adviser provides comparable services" to
those clients, and according to Harris, this is simply not the case:
Petitioners' claims that the institutional-client comparison is "highly
probative" and "highly pertinent," . . . cannot apply in all cases, or

even most. Section 36(b) provides no mandate for courts to demand
that mutual fund fees match some institutional fee. And the "mostfavored-pricing" rule that petitioners seek to impose ignores the substantial differences that exist between mutual funds and other
accounts. To be sure, an investment adviser provides portfolio management services for both types of accounts, including security selection, research, trading and asset allocation. But the similarities largely
end there.15 1
Thus, Harris asserted, a mutual fund adviser's fees should only be
compared to other mutual fund adviser's fees, and if the fees are "neither
'so disproportionate' nor 'so unusual' [in relation to each other] to support a conclusion of fiduciary breach[,]"l 5 2 the analysis should end there.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court attempted to strike a balance. The
unanimous Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's opinion, reaffirming
Gartenberg and clarifying some of the issues that had been plaguing
lower courts.'15 First, the Court acknowledged that fair process should
play at least somewhat of a role in a 36(b) analysis:
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 30.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 144, at 25-32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 40 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 55.
Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
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[A] court's evaluation of an investment adviser's fiduciary duty must
take into account both procedure and substance . . . . Thus, if the

disinterested directors considered the relevant factors, their decision
to approve a particular fee agreement is entitled to considerable
weight, even if a court might weigh the factors differently . . . . In

contrast, where the board's process was deficient or the adviser withheld important information, the court must take a more rigorous look
at the outcome. When an investment adviser fails to disclose material
information to the board, greater scrutiny is justified because the
withheld information might have hampered the board's ability to
function as "an independent check upon the management."'
Second, the Court held that in determining whether the fee is proportionate, lower courts could look at the fees charged to institutional
clients, but noted that these fees may not always provide a reliable comparison. The Court cautioned lower courts only to "give such comparisons the weight that they merit in light of the similarities and differences
between the services that the clients in question require," and was quick
to point out that "the Act does not necessarily ensure fee parity between
mutual funds and institutional clients contrary to petitioners' contentions."' In light of the fact that courts have generally understood this to
be the rule yet have routinely declined to make such comparisons
because of perceived incomparability between the services rendered, it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court's holding will have a significant impact
on the outcome of section 36(b) claims in the future.
Justice Thomas wrote a short concurrence for the purpose of noting
that although the Court characterized its own opinion as a reaffirmation
of "the Gartenberg standard," in fact, the Court's analysis is actually
(and properly, in his opinion) more circumscribed than Gartenberg's
multi-factor fairness review. 15 6 In short, Thomas underscored the point
made by the majority-"the standard for fiduciary breach under § 36(b)
does not call for judicial second-guessing of informed board
decisions."'5 7
Although the Jones plaintiffs got much of what they asked for from
the Supreme Court, it seems unlikely in light of Gartenberg'slong history that the Court's opinion, which essentially restored the status quo,
will work in their favor.
B.

Scholarly Solutions

There is disagreement about whether Gartenbergis broken. Never154. Id. at 1429-30.
155. Id. at 1429.

156. Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
157. Id. (quoting id. at 1430 (majority opinion)).
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theless, unless the competitive deficiencies perceived by Congress when
enacting 36(b) were merely a figment of its imagination, it seems apparent that Gartenberghas done little to remedy the problem. The majority
of scholars who have written on this topic agree. However, they disagree on how it should be remedied. One of the dominant themes in
these recent publications has been a call for comparisons with fees paid
by institutional investors. For instance, Professors Freeman, Brown, and
Pomeranz advance a test that parallels the framework set out by the
Supreme Court in McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green,'

for "analyzing

disparate treatment cases relying on circumstantial evidence of discrimination."' 5 9 In brief, their test would require plaintiffs to make a prima
facie showing of "disparate treatment" (i.e., significantly higher fees for
captive funds than institutional funds). Then, "the defendant must produce evidence to rebut the presumption of discrimination,""o which
might include evidence that the services provided are substantively different and justify the fee disparity.'"' Ultimately however, the burden
would remain on the plaintiff to show that the differences do not explain
the disparity and thus acceptance of the fee constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.162 Of course, underlying Freeman's test is his own (seemingly well-evidenced) assumption that the services provided to
institutional investors are not in fact substantially different than those
provided to captive funds.16 3
Additionally, in a recent article appropriately titled, Moving Beyond
Gartenberg: A Process Based and Comparative Approach to §36(b) of
the Investment Company Act,l" the authors (who just so happen to be

counsel of record for the Jones plaintiffs)' 65 argue for the same dual
prong standard they argued for in front of the Supreme Court: an insistence upon fair procedures as well as a fair price. Fair price, they contend, should be determined based on comparisons with the fees the
adviser charges its non-captive funds (e.g., pension funds).166 Essentially, they argue for the Gallus standard.
The problem with both of these formulations is that they can be
effective only if courts are willing to accept that the fees charged to
institutional investors are an appropriate benchmark for fair price. If
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 144.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id.

163. See id.
164. John M. Greabe et al., Moving Beyond Gartenberg: A Process Based and Comparative
Approach to §36(b) of the Investment Company Act, 28 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 133 (2009).

165. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144.
166. Greabe et al., supra note 164, at 135.
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they are not, we are back to square one-comparing mutual funds to
mutual funds, which, as we have seen, is a futile exercise.
A second important theme has been reassessment of director independence under the Act. After all, the Seventh Circuit Jones Court was
able to quickly dismiss allegations of process-based breaches because
according to Easterbrook's analysis, the directors and advisers had in
fact complied with the Act's rules. Professor Lyman Johnson argues that
the years since Gartenberghave yielded significant changes in the law
governing corporate fiduciaries and that mutual funds should benefit
from the trend toward increased director independence.1 6 7 He suggests
that Congress should "expand[ ] the category of interested persons under
section 2(a)(19)"l 68 and advocates a standard that gives director independence "greater procedural significance in section 36(b) litigation."1 69
Specifically, under Johnson's proposed standard (derived by analogy to
corporate law), if the board's directors are established to be "independent," a reviewing court should apply a deferential standard in reviewing
the fees. However, if the advisers fail to establish that the board is independent or choose not to do so, then under section 36(b)(2), no consideration should be given to the board's approval of the fee.170 Notably,
"the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proof throughout."' 7 1 Johnson argues that this approach gives section 36(b)(2), which provides that
the board's approval of the fee be given "such consideration by the court
as is deemed appropriate under the circumstances," "equal dignity" to
section 36(b)(1), which places the burden of proof on plaintiffs. 1 7 2
Most intriguing of all is Johnson's submission that damages under
section 36(b) should no longer be limited to restitution. Johnson convincingly makes the case that restitution alone provides little deterrence
and argues that a more effective solution might be to force advisers to
prominently disclose adverse 36(b) verdicts in all of their investor communications for a period of time. 7 3 If nothing else, the threat of this
embarrassment could encourage good behavior.
Professor Johnson's call for reform of the ICA's independence
rules is undoubtedly a necessary step in the right direction.17 1 Moreover, his proposed standard properly draws attention to the fundamental
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Johnson, supra note 52.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
Id.
Id.at 533.
As Johnson notes, even the Securities and Exchange Commission has advanced

rulemaking efforts that would limit certain "regulatory privileges under the [ICA] . . . . to

companies where at least seventy-five percent of the directors and the board chairman are
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disconnect between the development of fiduciary duty law in the corporate context and the lack of development in the mutual fund context.
However Professor Johnson's standard does not go far enough. More
sweeping reform of section 36(b) is necessary if it is to provide a realistic remedy for investors.
C.

An Entirely Fair Solution: Importing the Law of Corporate
FiduciaryDuties in Conflict Transactions

As previously mentioned, the problem with the comparative
approach is that it presupposes that the fees charged to institutional clients can serve as a reliable benchmark for fair price."' However, not all
scholars agree with this assessment"' and as alluded to by the Supreme
Court in Jones, it is not clear that the lower courts will either. Moreover, assuming that Congress was correct in its determination that the
mutual fund market suffers from competitive deficiencies, the fees other
advisers charge their captive funds provide a worthless comparison. Just
because the fees are similar to each other does not mean that they are
meaningfully related to value. Thus, a standard that includes a review of
procedural fairness is necessary. As we have seen though, process-based
approaches become seriously problematic under the framework of section 36(b). Recall the quote from Gallus: "Congress allocated the burden
of proof to plaintifs, both with respect to establishing the existence of a
breach of fiduciary duty,.. . as well as demonstrating the existence of a
cognizable financial harm resulting from that breach."' 7 Hence, even
Easterbrook's disclosure dispositive standard, if met, leaves plaintiffs
with the burden of proving to what extent the process failure adversely
impacted the fee, if at all.
It is this exact problem that has led Delaware courts to apply the
entire fairness standard in conflict transactions, particularly so-called
"interested-party" mergers wherein a controlling majority shareholder
who owes fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders is on both sides
of the transaction.17 1 Under entire fairness review, a plaintiff must first
allege "some basis for invoking the fairness obligation."" 9 Thereafter,
independent." Id. at 498 (citing Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,380-81 (Aug. 2, 2004)).
175. See discussion supra Part II.B.
176. See e.g., Coates & Hubbard, supra note 4.
177. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 823 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see
discussion supra Part I.A.
178. See generally Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of Corporate Combination Law: Policy

Issues and Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C. L. REv. 687 (1998) (explaining the application of
entire fairness review in interested-party mergers); see also Weinberg v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983).
179. Weinberg, 457 A.2d at 703.
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"the ultimate burden of proof is on the [defendant] to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transaction is fair."'s 0 This requires a
showing of both fair price and fair process.' 8 ' "However, the test for
fairness is not a bifurcated one . . . . All aspects of the issue must be

examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness."182
Where the transaction has been approved by an informed vote of either
disinterested directors or minority shareholders, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to show that the transaction was in fact unfair.18 3 However,
even then, "the burden clearly remains on those relying on the vote to
show that they completely disclosed all material facts relevant to the

transaction."

84

The rationale behind entire fairness review, according to several
former and current Chancellors and Vice Chancellors of the Delaware
Court of Chancery, is two-fold. First, "where ... a majority of the board
is conflicted, i.e., where a majority have personal interests in the transaction that are adverse to the interest of the shareholders, it cannot be presumed that the board will be motivated to achieve the [best] transaction
Second, and more importantly, is "the
price the market will permit."'
transactions, the price at
non-arms-length
in
difficulty of ascertaining,
which the deal would have been effected in the market."1 86 This is the
same difficulty that has plagued section 36(b) plaintiffs for years and the
rationale for applying it to mutual fund advisers who, like corporate
boards of directors and majority shareholders, must act as fiduciaries is
the same.
The "shifting burden" framework of the entire fairness standard is
more plaintiff friendly than Professor Johnson's proposed standard
because it formally allocates the burden of proof to defendants until they
show approval of the transaction by an independent board. Moreover, as
Professor Johnson accurately notes,' 8 7 courts applying entire fairness
review specifically recognize that in certain situations the burden does
not shift to plaintiffs, even if defendants can show approval by a formally "disinterested" committee. First articulated in Rabkin v. Olin
Corp.,'8 8 and re-approved of by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v.
180. Id.
181. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporate Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 873

(2001).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Weinberg, 457 A.2d at 711.
Id.
Id.
Allen et al., supra note 181, at 876.
Id.
Johnson, supra note 52, at 531.
No. 7547, 1990 WL 47648 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990), affid, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990).
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Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.,' 89 there is a two-prong test for
determining whether the burden should shift back to plaintiffs:
The mere existence of an independent special committee . . . does not

itself shift the burden. At least two factors are required. First, the
majority shareholder must not dictate the terms of the merger ....
Second, the special committee must have real bargainingpower that
it can exercise with the majority shareholder on an arms length
basis. 190

Although the test is framed with the backdrop of cash-out mergers
in mind, the principle is equally applicable to mutual fund fee negotiations. In deciding whether the burden should shift to plaintiffs,
"[p]articular consideration must be given to evidence of whether the special committee was truly independent, fully informed, and had the freedom to negotiate at arm's length.""' In other words, the approving body
must not only be "disinterested" in the formalistic sense mandated by
section 10 of the Act,19 2 it must also perform independently. A strict
application of the entire fairness test ensures that if the approving body,
in this case the board of directors, is "acutely aware" 93 that it has no
real bargaining power, the burden remains on defendants. If an adviser
fails to meet its burden of proving that the fees approved by the board
are entirely fair, then the court should find a breach of fiduciary duty
with respect to receipt of that compensation.
Notably, the entire fairness framework contemplates a second alternative for a fiduciary to shift the burden to plaintiffs-approval of the
transaction by a majority of disinterested, fully informed shareholders.194 Although Delaware corporate law requires that the transaction
actually be contingent upon approval by the shareholders in order to
shift the burden,195 such a drastic rule is probably unnecessary in this
context. Rather, similar to the non-binding votes on executive compensation advanced by proposed "say-on-pay" legislation,' 96 a non-binding
189. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
190. Id. at 1117 (quoting Rabkin, 1990 WL 47648 at *6) (emphasis added); see also Kahn v.
Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429 (Del. 1997) ("To obtain the benefit of burden shifting, the
controlling shareholder must do more than establish a perfunctory special committee of outside
directors.").
191. Id. at 1120-21 (emphasis added).
192. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10 (2006).
193. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 n.6 (quoting Rabkin, 1990 WL 47648 at *13).
194. Id. at 1117.
195. Rabkin, 1990 WL 47648, at *6 (explaining that in the context of interested mergers, a
non-binding vote by minority shareholders is not sufficient because it is "virtually ceremonial in
light of the foregone conclusion . . . that the merger would be approved by way of [defendants]
control of a majority of [the corporation's] stock").
196. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009); Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111 th Cong. § 3 (2009).
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investor vote on adviser compensation could serve as an alternative burden shifting mechanism.
Advisers hoping to limit their exposure to 36(b) claims would have
an incentive to urge the board to put compensation agreements to a vote.
And, like say-on-pay, the mere existence of the vote, while not determinative of or binding on the fee negotiations, would increase transparency
and accountability 9 7 and lend credibility to the argument advanced by
Judge Easterbrook that investors "vote with their feet and dollars" to
"determine how much advisory services are worth." 98
Placing the burden of proof on advisers in section 36(b) claims
would give the provision effect, and would be consistent with modem
fiduciary duty analysis in conflict transactions. Of course, this change
must come from Congress, as it is impossible for a court to circumvent
the burden on plaintiffs imposed by section 36(b)(1). If section 36(b) is
to provide a meaningful check on adviser fees, the burden on plaintiffs
must be abandoned.
V.

CONCLUSION

In sum, there can be no doubt that Jones leaves mutual fund investors in the same position they were in under Gartenberg,and even in the
same position they were in before section 36(b) was enacted. As has
been shown, courts have widely refused to accept institutional investor
fees as reliable benchmarks, leaving mutual fund plaintiffs with the near
impossible burden of proving what fee would have been negotiated in
the market if not for the anti-competitive nature of the industry. Unfortunately, no judicially formulated standard can help plaintiffs if the burden
remains on them to prove defendant's breach under section 36(b). If
Congress is firm in its conviction that the mutual fund industry is insulated from competitive forces and concludes that, as a result, investors
are paying too much, then it must be equally firm in crafting a remedy
that does more than pay lip service to those investor's claims.

197. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, 29-30, 73 (2009), available at http://www.
financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport web.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FACT SHEET:
ENSURING INVESTORS HAVE A "SAY ON PAY", available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/fact sheet-say%20on%20pay.pdf (explaining that the goal of say-on-pay is to "improve
board accountability and better align compensation with long term value creation for
shareholders").
198. Jones II, 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008).

